After the liberation of Paris, the advance in northern France came to a halt. The Allied forces regrouped, then cleaned up the remaining German resistance and on the 29th of August 1944, the advance towards Belgium continued. Montgomery's tanks encountered hardly any resistance on the way and made great progress. The German army was totally disorganized. Their troops had the choice between running or surrendering. On the 4th of September 1944, the Allies reached the Belgian city of Antwerp. It seemed as if nothing could stop Montgomery's march to the Rhine.
The Dutch expected that liberation would come soon. So did the Germans! Their army in the Netherlands fled north and east of Holland. The Dutch people observed their chaotic withdrawal on Tuesday 5 September with enjoyment. It was called 'Dolle Dinsdag' (‘Mad Tuesday'). But unfortunately 'Mad Tuesday' didn't mean the end of the occupation. Allied supplies just couldn't keep up with the rapid advance. Allied tanks were forced to stop due to fuel shortages.There was only one port to supply the Allied forces and its was in Normandy a hundred miles away. That’s why supply was so slow. While the Allied leaders carried on discussions about what strategy to follow, the German army regrouped and was sent back to the new Dutch front.
The military leader of the Allied forces was the American General Dwight Eisenhower. Leading an army that consisted of allied nations was a difficult task in which public opinion and politics could not be ignored. The cooperation between the Britons and Americans was not without friction, as was the case with Eisenhower and the British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery.
Montgomery, promoted to Field Marshal on the 1st of September 1944, believed the battle in the West could be ended before Christmas. He thought one big thrust towards Berlin, supported by all available resources, would be the way to end the war. Eisenhower, on the other hand, preferred a double thrust. He assumed that Germany would use what remained of their army to defend the Ruhr and the Saar (both important German industrial regions). So those were the areas where Eisenhower thought the Allied assaults should be concentrated. Although he said the thrust northwards should be emphasized, he did not agree with Montgomery that the operation should be begun at the expense of all other operations.
Before Eisenhower and Montgomery met to discuss the matter, Montgomery already had figured out how he could use the Airborne divisions at his disposal. The message from England that London was being attacked by V-2 missiles made Montgomery choose an assault over the rivers Maas and Waal, with the bridge at Arnhem as the primary target. Under this strategy, the western part of the Netherlands, where the missile bases were located, would be cut off from the Germans and London would be free of V-2 attacks.
Montgomery was a man of persuasion, whereas Eisenhower was cautious and prone to compromise. So when the two men met, it was Eisenhower who gave in. The decisive point Montgomery made was that his plan would cover manoeuvres in the mouth of the Schelde river, and that Antwerp's harbour would soon be operational. Furthermore, if the bridges over the Rhine were in Allied hands, they could continue the attacks against the Ruhr area. One demand Eisenhower made was that Montgomery’s 21st Army Group's logistical priority would be short lived. Although Montgomery preferred absolute priority, Eisenhower didn't intend to give up his broad-front strategy.
This map shows the intent of Operation Market Garden.
'Market' was the code name for the airborne actions, and 'Garden' was the code
name for the ground troops. The 1st Allied Airborne Corps was set up in August
1944 and consisted of the American 18th Airborne Corps (82nd and 101st Airborne
divisions) and the British 1st Airborne Division. Later the Polish 1st
Parachute Brigade was added. The Airborne Corps’ job was to clear the way for
the British XXX (30th) Corps situated near the Belgian city of Neerpelt.
The U.S. 101st Airborne Division had its drop zone
near Eindhoven, Best, Son, St-Oedenrode and Veghel. The 101st had to secure the
bridge over the Wilhelmina canal in Son, the bridge over the Dommel in
St-Oedenrode and the bridges over the Aa and Zuid-Willemsvaart canal near
Veghel. The bridges over the Maas at Grave and the Waal at Nijmegen were the
targets of the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division; they were dropped near Groesbeek
and Overasselt.
Finally, the British 1st Airborne Division had to secure the bridge over the Rhine at Arnhem. All this led to a small corridor, so that the British XXX Corps could make their advance towards Arnhem. Both the XII (12th Corps) and the VIII Corps (8th Corps) were to give side cover to the advancing XXX Corps. This corridor was named 'Hell's Highway' because this route was very poor. Sometimes as narrow as one road!
Finally, the British 1st Airborne Division had to secure the bridge over the Rhine at Arnhem. All this led to a small corridor, so that the British XXX Corps could make their advance towards Arnhem. Both the XII (12th Corps) and the VIII Corps (8th Corps) were to give side cover to the advancing XXX Corps. This corridor was named 'Hell's Highway' because this route was very poor. Sometimes as narrow as one road!
Arnhem was the main target of Operation Market Garden
because it was a good place from where the Ruhr could be assaulted. Also
attacking the Ruhr out of Arnhem would bypass the Siegfried line, situated near the border in southwest Germany. From Arnhem the
Allies could also continue the liberation of the Netherlands, such as the
advance to the IJsselmeer lake.
When Montgomery revealed his plan to General Brereton
and General Browning, Browning asked how long it would take for the tanks to
reach Arnhem. "Two days" answered Montgomery. "We can hold it
for four days" replied Browning, and then he added, "although I think
we could go a bridge too far", not knowing how right he was.
After
Eisenhower's fiat for the operation there was plenty of work to do. All kinds
of preparations had to be made because within a week this gigantic operation
had to start. The drop zones near Arnhem, Groesbeek and the area between the
Maas and the Waal already had been photographed during reconnaissance flights
intended for Operation Comet, a British proposition to bring the airborne
troops into action. Since they were familiar with Arnhem and surroundings
because of their Operation Comet studies, this probably was the reason the
British 1st Airborne Division was chosen to secure the Arnhem sector. Urquhart,
fearing German guns near the bridge, chose the landing and drop zones near
Wolfheze, Renkum and Heelsum. These zones were rather remote from their main
target, Arnhem bridge. But even if there weren't any German guns, the ground
near the bridge was unsuitable for landing. Strangely, this area was selected
as a drop zone for the Polish troops.
The U.S. 101st Airborne Division was to land in the Eindhoven-sector. They got this area because the division was stationed in South England. This meant they could be flown to their destination without crossing the flight routes of other airborne troops. The only sector left was Nijmegen. So this sector was allocated to the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division. 35,000 men and equipment, such as jeeps and guns, had to be transported to these areas. Furthermore, they had to be protected and resupplied. An operation like this had never been done before. The first problem was transportation. Around 2,500 gliders were available for transporting men and equipment. One third of the 35,000 men was going to be transported by gliders, while the other two thirds used troop carrier planes and had to parachute at the chosen drop zones. It was clear from the beginning that such a large number of men could not be brought to their targets in just one day. Only one airlift per day was feasible. It would take 2 or 3 days to bring all the men and their equipment to their destinations. This would reduce the surprise effect, but there was no other choice. It had to be decided what had to go first.
The airborne invasion had to take place in daylight to increase the accuracy of the landings and to ensure quick grouping. Besides, the Luftwaffe (German air force) was practically absent in Western airspace. Still, it wasn't without risk. Approximately 1,500 fighter planes (British Spitfires, Typhoons, Tempests, Mosquitos and American Thunderbolts, Lightnings and Mustangs) had to hit German anti-aircraft guns before the first airlift could pass, and they had to escort the whole armada along the route. Rescue ships in the North Sea were to go into action if an aircraft went down and they also functioned as 'signposts' for the passing planes.
Almost everybody thought that this battle was going to be a "piece of cake". Nothing would stand in their way. You could also say nothing was allowed to stand in the way. Finally the airborne troops would be a part of the war again! They were fed up with all the cancelled operations. This time it was for real and nothing could stop it. This frame of mind probably was the reason that Dutch Resistance reports of the presence of Panzer units in Arnhem (later confirmed by reconnaissance photos) were totally ignored by the British.
On September 16th, "Operation Market Garden" was confirmed. It would start on September 17th, 1944.
End of part one.
